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Case No. 20150266-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JACK DANIEL BROWN, 
Appellant/Petitionet, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Respondent. 
Brief of A ppellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Brown appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction 
relief, challenging his conviction for aggravated murder, a first degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(b)O) (West 
2015). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Brown pleaded guilty to aggravated murder and was sentenced in 2008 
(R74, 96-97). He did not move to withdraw his plea and did not appeal. Brown 
filed his post-conviction petition in 2013 (Rl-8). The lower court dismissed the 
petition as untimely (R136-38, 165-68; Addenda Band C). 
1. Did the lower court correctly dismiss Brown's untimely petition? 
Standard of Review: An appeal from an order dismissing a petition for 
post-conviction relief is reviewed for correctness without deference to the lower 
court's conclusions of law. Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85, if 6,293 P.3d 259. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-106 (procedural bar) 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107 (statute of limitations) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Brown was charged with aggravated murder, a 
capital felony, aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, and obstruction of 
justice, a second degree felony (R3). He pleaded guilty to aggravated murder 
and was sentenced to life in prison without parole on January 25, 2008 (case no. 
061500626) (R74, 96-97). 1 The other charges were dismissed (RS). Brown did 
not move to withdraw his plea and did not appeal. He filed a petition for post-
conviction relief in 2013 (Rl-8).2 The post-conviction court entered a 
preliminary order noting that the petition appeared untimely (R27-29). The 
court gave notice that it was raising the time bar sua sponte, and gave both 
1 Although Brown was sentenced the same day he entered his guilty plea, 
the judgment was not filed until January 30, 2008 (R97). 
2 Brown actually filed a motion for re-sentencing in the Utah Supreme 
Court (Rl-8). That court referred the 1natter to the dish·ict court, and the motion 
for re-sentencing was filed in the district court as a post-conviction petition 
(case no. 130500433) (R18). 
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parties sixty days to "bring to the Court's attention any pertinent facts or legal 
arguments related to the timeliness of the petition" since a petitioner is entitled 
to an opportunity to be heard and to explain why his claim is not subject to a 
procedural or time bar. Id. 
Brown filed an a1nended memorandum in support of his petition (R34-
60). The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely (R61-107). 
Brown did not oppose the State's motion to dis1niss, and the district court 
granted it (R136-138; Addendum B). An amended order was designated as a 
final order (R165-168; Addendum C). Brown timely appealed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The dish·ict court properly dismissed the petition because it was 
untimely. On appeal, Brown argues that the dish·ict court erred in dismissing 
the petition because the so-called "egregious injustice exception" could have 
been applied. But the post-conviction court could not apply an "egregious 
injustice" exception to the untimely petition because doing so would violate 
rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which obliges district courts to apply 
the PCRA as written. Only the Supreme Court can suspend rule 65C and 
recognize such an exception to the statute of limitations. In any event, Brown 
has not met the threshold requirements the supreme court has identified that 
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must be met before the court would even consider whether an "egregious 
injustice" exception exists at all. 
Brown also argues that the limitations period should be tolled because he 
is mentally ill and was not on antipsychotic medication until 2013. But this 
argmnent is unpreserved because it was never raised in the post-conviction 
court below, and Brown fails to justify appellate review under any established 
preservation rule. 
Brown also claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Since 
Brown fails to establish error in the lower court's time bar ruling, this Court 
need not consider the merits of Brown's underlying claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
BROWN'S UNTIMELY PETITION 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) bars relief on any claim filed 
more than one year after the cause of action accrues. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-
106(1)(e), -107 (West 2009) (Addendum A). See also Winward v. State, 2012 UT 
85, ,r12, 293 P.3d 259. 
A. The post-conviction petition was untimely because it was not 
filed within one year of the last day for filing an appeal. 
For petitioners like Brown who do not directly appeal, the cause of action 
ordinarily accrues on "the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the 
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final judgment of conviction." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(2)(a). The criminal 
court entered its final judgment on January 30, 2008 (R97). Brown's time to 
appeal thus expired, and his post-conviction claims accrued, on March 1, 2008. 
Brown therefore had until February 28, 2009, to file a post-conviction petition. 
He did not file his petition until August 8, 2013, four and one half years too 
late. 3 The petition was therefore untimely. 
The PCRA contains later accrual dates and a tolling provision. Because 
the State raised the time bar defense, Brown bore the burden of proving that he 
should be allowed to proceed with his claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-105(2). 
As shown below, he failed to meet that burden. Therefore, the district court 
properly dismissed the untimely petition. 
B. Brown did not prove that his cause of action accrued on a later 
date that would make his petition timely. 
A cause of action may also accrue - thus starting the one-year period - on 
"the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based." Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107(2)(e). 
3 Beginning on December 16, 2011, Brown began filing motions (such as a 
motion for discovery and a motion for re-sentencing) in the underlying criminal 
case. He then filed a motion in the Utah Supreme court on July 17, 2013 (R1). 
On August 1, 2013, the Supreme Court entered an Order which referred the 
1natter to the dish·ict court (R18). Brown's earlier motions do not qualify as 
post-conviction petitions, but even if they did, they were all filed more than two 
years beyond the PCRA's one year limitations period. 
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Brown acknowledged that his petition was filed "after the one year 
statute of limitations." (R34). But he argued that his petition should not be 
dismissed because it was based on his "new found understanding of the legal 
significance of the material he had already been in possession of." (R34-35). 
Brown argues that his petition was timely because he did not discover his 
counsel's misconduct until "more than a year later." (Aplt. Br. at 2). Although 
he does not now specify what alleged misconduct he is referring to, Brown 
asserted below that he received ineffective assistance because his counsel did 
not tell him before pleading that he was entitled to a sentencing phase hearing 
under Utah Code section 76-3-207. Brown asserts that he only became aware of 
this in March, 2012. Even if this could qualify as the accrual date for Brown's 
cause of action, the petition was still untimely because it was not filed until over 
a year later, on August 8, 2013. 4 
Brown also asserts that his counsel cmnmitted misconduct by agreeing to 
pay for an out-of-state prison h·ansfer if Brown would accept a plea (Aplt. Br. at 
2). If true, Brown obviously knew about this agreement before entering his 
4 Even if the claim were timely, Brown would not be entitled to post-
conviction relief because the claim is meritless. Brown acknowledged that he 
agreed to a sentence of life without possibility of parole. Once Brown accepted 
the plea bargain and pleaded guilty, he waived his right to a penalty phase 
hearing in exchange for the prosecution not seeking the death penalty. A "court 
may entertain a plea bargain conditioned upon an agreement to impose a 
particular sentence." State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1300 (Utah 1986). 
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plea. But he asserts that he did not discover that this agreement was "not legal" 
and was "against the rules of conduct" until "more than a year later." 5 Id. 
By its plain terms, section 107(2)(e)'s new-evidence accrual date only 
postpones accrual until a petitioner does or reasonably could discover 
"evidentiary facts on which the petition is based." It does not postpone accrual 
until the petitioner comes to understand the legal significance of those facts. 
This Court recently clarified this. The "time for filing begins to run when the 
petitioner knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known 
the evidentiary facts and 'not when the petitioner recognizes their legal 
significance."' Brown v. State, 2015 UT App 254, il9, 361 P.3d 124 (alteration 
omitted) (citing Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
The PCRA gives a petitioner an entire year to determine whether any of 
the facts of his case could give rise to a legally supportable claim for post-
conviction relief. And to the extent he is prevented from making that 
5 Even if the claim were timely, Brown would not be entitled to post-
conviction relief because his own proffer shows that he cannot prove his claim. 
Brown attached a copy of a letter sent to him from his counsel Mike Esplin. 
That letter states: "I certainly remember our conversation about your wanting a 
transfer. I also remember that both Mary and I advised you that being able to 
be transferred was not a condition of your plea, and that you should make the 
decision based upon the other considerations such as sh·ength of the state's 
case, likelihood of being able to get a better result from a jury, and being able to 
be assured of getting the death penalty off the table. I recall that your decision 
was based on those factors, not the possibility of getting a transfer." 
(Addendum D). 
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determination by mental or physical incapacity, or by unconstitutional state 
action, the limitations period will be tolled. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107(3). 
The distinction between knowledge of evidentiary facts and appreciation 
of their legal significance mirrors well-established federal case law applying a 
similar statute of limitations in the federal habeas corpus context. Under 28 
United States Code section 2244, the one-year limitation period runs from "the 
date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have 
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. §2244( d) 
(l)(D). "Factual predicate" under the federal statute is no different than 
"evidentiary facts" under the PCRA. 
Under federal case law, the time "begins when the prisoner knows (or 
through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner 
recognizes their legal significance." Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(emphasis added). If the habeas statute of limitations "used a subjective rather 
than an objective standard, then there would be no effective time limit." Id. 
Brown failed to establish that any new evidentiary facts made his cause 
of action accrue on a later date. He therefore caimot establish that the post-
conviction court erred by denying the petition as untimely. 
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C. Brown failed to establish that the tolling provision should be 
applied. 
The PCRA states that the limitations period is tolled for any period 
during which the petitioner was "prevented from filing a petition due to state 
action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or 
mental incapacity." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(3). 
The post-conviction court ruled that Brown had "not raised a colorable 
argument that he was 'prevented from filing a petition due to state action in 
violation of United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental 
incapacity."' (R165) (citation omitted). Brown has failed to establish that this 
ruling was in error. 
On appeal, Brown asserts that he only became aware of the tolling 
provision when it was quoted in the district court's decision to dismiss the 
petition (Aplt. Br. at 3). But the State cited the tolling provision in its motion to 
dismiss, which it filed and served on Brown more than six months before the 
court's ruling (R69-70). Brown did not oppose that motion. And Brown's 
unawareness of the tolling provision does not satisfy its requirements. 
1. Brown failed to establish that he was prevented from timely 
filing his petition by state action. 
On appeal, Brown argues that he "is reasonably justified in failing to 
meet the one-year statute of limitations ... because the legal resources available 
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to him as an incarcerated defendant are insufficient." (Aplt. Br. at 3). Brown 
presents no other argument or discussion of this issue other than this one 
sentence. Brown never raised this argument below. It is therefore unpreserved. 
Utah courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed 
should not be addressed on appeal. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 
(Utah 1989). Brown not only failed to assert why or how the legal resources 
available to him were insufficient, but he also acknowledges that he discussed 
legal matters with the prison contract attorneys (Aplt. Br. at 3). He has failed to 
show that legal resources were not available to him. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the "fundamental 
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist 
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing 
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons 
trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491 (1977); see 
also Crawford v. Smith, 578 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1978). 
Utah contracts with attorneys to meet its Bounds obligations. See, e.g., 
Carper v. Deland, 54 F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1995). To establish a Bounds violation, 
Brown would have to demonstrate that alleged shortcomings in the prison 
contract attorney's assistance actually hindered his efforts to pursue a non-
frivolous legal claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Brown failed to 
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even make this assertion. The district court correctly determined that Brown 
had not raised a colorable argument that he was prevented from timely filing a 
petition due to state action. 
2. Brown failed to establish that he was prevented from timely 
filing his petition due to physical or mental incapacity. 
On appeat Brown argues that the limitations period should be tolled 
because he "is mentally ill and has not been on antipsychotic medication until 
2013." (Aplt. Br. at 3). He asserts that it is only since being on anti-psychotic 
medication that he has been able to comprehend that his counsel's actions were 
illegal and has been able to discuss these legal matters with the contract 
attorneys. Id. But Brown never raised this argument in the post-conviction 
court below.6 It is therefore unpreserved. Brown does not argue plain error or 
any other exception to the preservation rule. And Brown fails to present any 
additional information or evidence to establish that he was mentally 
incapacitated, when he became incapacitated, when he began taking anti-
6 In his amended memorandum, Brown asserted that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his life history for mitigation 
evidence. As part of that argument, he asserted that he was enrolled in special 
education classes, had a learning disability, and did not graduate high school 
until he obtained his diploma as an inmate. He also asserted that he had 
"severe mental damages" for which he was being treated and taking medication 
(R36-38). Brown argued that if his counsel had been effective, they would have 
"discovered the difficulties of petitioner's developing years as a child." (R38). 
But this argument related to trial counsel's mitigation investigation, not a 
tolling claim. 
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psychotic medication, or that he was unable to file a petition when not on this 
medication. Brown fails to assert why or how his particular mental challenges 
prevented him from timely filing his petition. 
And the mere fact that a petitioner has mental challenges is not an 
exception to the statute of limitations. There is no mental incapacitation 
exception. There is only a tolling provision. A petitioner is not exempt from 
the statute of limitations merely because he has mental challenges. Rather, a 
petitioner must prove that he is entitled to have the statute of limitations tolled 
during the time period that he "was prevented from filing a petition ... due to 
mental incapacity." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(3) (e1nphasis added). "The 
petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence" that 
he is entitled to relief under the tolling provision. Id. Brown has not met that 
burden. 
Indeed, Brown's own behavior demonsh·ated an ability to access the 
courts and litigate claims. Brown filed multiple motions (such as a motion for 
discovery and a motion for re-sentencing) in the underlying criminal case. He 
does not explain how his alleged mental incapacity prevented him from filing a 
timely post-conviction petition, but did not prevent him from filing other 
pleadings in the criminal case. 
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3. This Court should disregard Brown's unpreserved claims 
because he does not justify appellate review under 
established exceptions. 
This Court should not consider Brown's unpreserved claims because he 
does not argue any basis to excuse his preservation failure. Generally, "'claims 
not raised before the h·ial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Benson, 
2014 UT App 92, iJ24, 325 P.3d 855 (quotations and citation omitted). An 
appellate court will address an unpreserved "issue only if (1) the appellant 
establishes that the district court committed 'plain error,' (2) 'exceptional 
circumstances' exist, or (3) in some situations, if the appellant raises a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue." State v. Lou,, 
2008 UT 58, if 19, 192 P.3d 867. 
'"[E]xceptional circumstances' is a concept that is used sparingly, 
properly reserved for truly exceptional situations" such as "rare procedural 
anomalies." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996) (quotation and 
citation omitted). No such circumstances exist here. 
An appellant cannot adequately brief an unpreserved issue unless he 
presents his argument "through the lens of one ... of these exceptions." See 
State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ,121, 167 P.3d 1046; see also Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(5) (requiring an appellant, in his opening brief, to either demonstrate that 
the issue was preserved or state an exception for considering the unpreserved 
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issue). An appellate court will not consider unpreserved issues when the 
appellant articulates no justification for review. Brown does not argue through 
the lens of any exception to the preservation rule. Therefore, this Court should 
not review his unpreserved claims. See id. ,r 21. 
In any event, Brown has not demonstrated that the post-conviction court 
plainly erred by not tolling the one-year time limit. "To prevail under plain 
error review, a defendant must demonstrate that '[1] an error exists; [2] the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful, 
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome."' Low, 2008 UT 58, ir20 (quoting State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, if17, 174 
P.3d 628). 
The record shows no obvious, prejudicial error in the lower court's 
conclusion that Brown had "not raised a colorable argument that he was 
"prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of United States 
Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity."' (R165). Since his claims 
lack merit, he would not have been entitled to post-conviction relief even if his 
petition had not been dismissed as untimely. 
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II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED AUTHORITY TO 
RECOGNIZE AN "EGREGIOUS INJUSTICE" EXCEPTION TO 
AN UNTIMELY FILING 
Brown argues that the district court erred in dismissing his petition 
because the so-called "egregious injustice" exception could have been applied 
as an exception to the PCRA (Aplt. Br. at 1). But the district court lacked 
authority to recognize an egregious injustice exception to an untimely filed 
petition. 
The Utah Supreme Court previously acknowledged the possibility of a 
constitutionally-based "egregious injustice" exception to the PCRA' s procedural 
limits, but it has yet to explicitly adopt such an exception (R210); Winward v. 
State, 2012 UT 85, 293 P.3d 259. The post-conviction court did not apply any 
"egregious injustice" exception. This Court may affirm because only the 
supreme court may create such an exception, which it has yet to do. 
A. The district court could not have excused Brown's untimely 
filing under a constitutionally-based "egregious injustice" 
exception because the supreme court has yet to recognize that 
such an exception exists or define when it would apply. 
Under the present state of the law, the judiciary has constitutional 
authority over post-conviction, post-appeal review of a criminal conviction. See 
Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, ill 7, 94 P.3d 263 (stating "the power to review 
post-conviction petitions '[q]uintessentially ... belongs to the judicial branch of 
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government'") ( quoting Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989) 
(discussing the scope of the writ of habeas corpus in the Utah constitution)). 
Relying on that precedent, the supreme court has reasoned that "'the legislature 
may not impose resh·ictions which limit [post-conviction relief] as a judicial rule 
of procedure, except as provided in the constitution."' Gardner, 2004 UT 42, ,I17 
(citation omitted). 
But the judicial branch's ownership does not inexorably give rise to a 
constitutional exception to the PCRA's statutory time bar. To the contrary, the 
supreme court, through its rule making authority, has determined that the 
judiciary will exercise its constitutional power over post-conviction cases within 
the confines of the PCRA. 
In 2009, the supreme court amended rule 65C(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to provide that the PCRA "sets forth the manner and extent to which 
a person may challenge the validity of a criminal conviction and sentence after 
the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65C(a) (2010). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 65C state that the 
rule amendments "embrace Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act as the law 
governing post-conviction relief." This direction required the district court to 
consider the petition under the PCRA, and not any extra-statutory exceptions. 
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In Gardner v. State, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that there may be 
a circumstance where it would be an "egregious injustice" to deny a petitioner 
relief even though his petition is untimely or otherwise procedurally barred. 
See 2010 UT 46, il,193-94, 234 P.3d 1115. But Gardner also established that only 
the Utah Supreme Court has the authority to recognize and establish extra-
statutory exceptions to the PCRA's time and procedural bars. The Gardner 
court noted that while rule 65C "embrace[s]" the PCRA as governing post-
conviction relief, "this court retains constitutional authority, even when a 
petition is procedurally barred, to determine whether denying relief would 
result in an egregious injustice." Id. if 93 ( emphasis added). The reference to 
"this court" obviously refers to the Utah Supreme Court. 
This limit dovetails with the supreme court's rule 65C amendment 
requiring the district courts to apply the PCRA. The Utah Constitution gives 
only the Utah Supreme Court the authority to "adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence." UTAH CONST. Art. 8, § 4 ("The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of 
procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process"). 
There is no corresponding provision conferring rule-making authority on 
the district courts. Because a district court must follow the Utah Supreme 
Court's rules, the district court lacked authority to read into the PCRA an extra-
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statutory "egregious injustice" exception in contravention of a supreme court 
rule requiring the courts to apply the PCRA. 
And because only the supreme court has rule-making authority, only it 
can suspend rule 65C' s requirement to follow the PCRA, and then recognize 
and define an "egregious injustice" exception. See Gardner, 2010 UT 46, if 93. 
Because the supreme court has yet to decide that such an exception exists, the 
district court could not apply the non-existent exception to excuse Brown's 
untimely filing. This Court should affirm for that reason alone. 
B. Alternatively, Brown cannot satisfy the threshold for considering 
whether an "egregious injustice" exists. 
In Winward v. State, the supreme court defined the threshold a petitioner 
must meet before that court would even consider whether to exercise its 
constitutional authority over post-conviction review to recognize any 
"egregious injustice" exception to the PCRA' s procedural limits. A petitioner 
must "demonstrate that he has a reasonable justification for 1nissing the 
deadline combined with a meritorious defense." Winward, 2012 UT 85, ,r 18. 
And the petitioner bears the "heavy burden" of demonstrating that his case 
presents such significant issues that the supre1ne court should address its 
constitutional authority to consider such an exception. Id. Brown cannot satisfy 
that threshold. 
-18-
1. Brown provided no reasonable justification for the late filing 
that would warrant considering whether to recognize an 
extra-statutory exception. 
Brown asserts that that he is mentally ill and that he was not on 
antipsychotic medication until 2013. But these assertions do not warrant an 
extra-statutory exception because the PCRA already accounts for them. As 
addressed above, the PCRA tolls the one-year time limit for any period during 
which a petitioner was unable to access the courts due to mental or physical 
incapacity. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(3). There is no reason to create an 
extra-statutory exception for a contingency the statute already covers. 
2. Brown cannot establish that his claims could meet the 
meritoriousness threshold to justify considering whether an 
egregious injustice exception exists. 
Brown also cannot prove the second threshold element of 
meritoriousness. A '" petitioner bears the burden of pointing to sufficient 
factual evidence or legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness."' 
Winward, 2012 UT 85, ~20 ( citing Adams, 2005 UT 62, if 20). "This means that the 
petition must have 'an arguable basis in fact,' which would 'support a claiin for 
relief as a matter of law."' Id. (citing Adams, 2005 UT 62, ~19). Brown has failed 




BROWN'S ASSERTIONS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL DO NOT ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR RELIEF 
On appeal, Brown claims that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Brown raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for three 
purposes: 
(1) He asserts that his petition should not have been dismissed as 
untimely because he received ineffective assistance of counsel; 
(2) He argues that an egregious injustice occurred based on his claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel; and 
(3) He raises his underlying claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
without addressing the timeliness issue. 
Brown is not entitled to appellate relief on any theory of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
A. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not establish a 
basis to proceed with an untimely petition. 
Brown argues that he was justified in failing to meet the one-year statute 
of limitations because he received ineffective assistance of counsel (Aplt. Br. at 
3). But recent case law confirms that merely alleging that counsel was 
ineffective is not a reasonable justification for missing the PCRA' s time 
limitation. Williams v. State, 2015 UT App 271, ~3, _ P.3d _ (stating 
argument "that ineffective assistance of counsel should have tolled the statute 
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of limitations is unpersuasive because 'the mere allegation that counsel was 
ineffective is not a reasonable justification for missing the PCRA' s time 
limitations."' ( quotations and citation omitted)). 
B. Brown's ineffective assistance claims do not establish 
entitlement to an egregious injustice exception to the statute of 
limitations. 
Brown argues that his counsel's "conduct was nothing short of egregious 
misconduct when he agreed to pay for an out of state transfer if he, appellant, 
were to accept a plea." (Aplt. Br. at 2). Brown has failed to establish that there 
was any 1nisconduct (see footnote 5, above). But even if there were, as 
discussed, the district court lacked authority to recognize an egregious injustice 
exception to an untimely filing. 
C. The district court properly declined to address the merits of 
Brown's ineffective assistance claims because they were 
untimely. 
On appeal, Brown asserts that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel (Aplt. Br. at 6). But the district court did not address the merits of this 
claim, and Brown does not allege or demonstrate error in that refusal. 
The district court properly declined to address the underlying merits of 
the claims because they were untimely. Because the court determined that the 
petition was untimely, it was not required to decide or even to comment on the 
merits of the underlying claims. In fact, rule 65C provides that the court must 
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first determine whether a claim is precluded as untimely before commenting on 
the merits. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b) (stating "if the court comments on the merits 
of a post-conviction claim, it shall first clearly and expressly determine whether 
that claim is independently precluded under Section 78B-9-106"). 
Brown's untimely ineffective assistance claims do not provide any basis 
for appellate relief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
At the conclusion of his brief, Brown requests that he be allowed to 
withdraw his plea. Even if successful on appeal, Brown would not be entitled 
to the relief he requests. The matter on appeal is the dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. The dismissal should be affirmed. But even if the 
dismissal were reversed, the available relief would be a remand to the post-
conviction court for the post-conviction case to proceed to the merits. 
-22-
..... _ ....... 
Respectfully submitted on December 17, 2015. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney Gener 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
~ (c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a 
previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
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(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
0 I I .. ,. . ,. ,., .. .. . ' , 
. , .. _:__.;\ •....:.:.: 
JACK DANIEL BROWN, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ON MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF Petitioner, 
vs. 
Case No. 13050433 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. Judge G. Michael Westfall 
Before the Court is the State's motion to dismiss Mr. Brown's petition for post-
conviction relief. Petitioner did not respond to the State's motion, though the Court, through 
Judge James L. Shumate, granted him additional time to address the issue of timeliness under 
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies ~ct (PCRA), Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-101 et seq. 
The Court has reviewed the motion, memorandum, and petition pursuant to the PCRA 
~ and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65( c ). The PCRA requires a post-conviction petition to be 
"filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(1). 
Plainly, the petition was not filed within one year of when the cause of action accrued, and 
Petitioner has not raised a colorable argument that he was "prevented from filing a petition due to 
state action in violation of United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity." 
Id. at (3). 
The State's motion is therefore GRANTED and the petition is therefore DISMISSED. 
DATED this /f-' day of June, 2014. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF N.I.AILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 115t" day of ~ , 2014, I provided a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON 
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF to each of the 
a parties/attorneys nained below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at 
the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States 
Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Jack Daniel Brown, #129334 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Erin Riley 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
e Case No. 13050~33 
Judge G. Michael Westfall 
Before the Court is the State's motion to dismiss Mr. Brown's petition for post-
conviction relief. Petitioner did not respond to the State's motion, though the Court. through 
Judge James L. Shumate, granted him additional time to address the issue of timeliness under 
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-101 et seq. 
The Court has reviewed the motion, memorandum, and petition pursuant to the PCRA 
and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). The PCRA requires a post-conviction petition to be 
"filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(1). 
Plainly, the petition was not filed within one year of when the cause of action accrued, and 
Petitioner has not raised a colorable argument that he was "prevented from filing a petition due to 
state action in violation of United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity.·· 
Id. at (3). 
The State's motion is therefore GRANTED and the petition is therefore DISMISSED. 
Although the court anticipated that there would be no question as to whether this was intended to 
be a final order, considering the unequivocal content of the Order. in light of the Order of 
Summary Dismissal, recently issued by the Utah Court of Appeals, in Case No. 20140631-CA, 
relying on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 201 P.3d 
966 (Utah 2009), the court grants the pending motions1 to designate this Order as a final order 
and hereby Orders, Adjudges and Decrees that .. no additional order is necessary." 
DATED this 5th day of February, 2015. 
1 Although Respondent had filed a Motion Asking the Court to Specifically Designate its 
Memorandum Decision and Order as a Final Order on September 30, 2014, neither party filed a 
request to submit that Motion for decision until after the Court of Appeals had issued its Order of 
Summary Dismissal, and the Motion was, therefore, not submitted for decision by the court (See 
Rule 7(d) URCP) until January 20, 2015. Petitioner filed a similar Motion and, although prior to 
having given Respondent an opportunity to respond. also filed a Request to Submit for Decision 
on January 30, 2015. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this Jij__ day of re 0. , 2015, I provided a true 
(@ and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ON MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF to each of the 
parties/attorneys named below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at 
the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States 
Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Jack Daniel Brown, #129334 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
3 
Erin Riley -- e ~1~cie -e ri I ·etA~(/.,./-d.,h · Ol,,t) V 
Office of the Attorney General \) U 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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Jack Brown 
Inmate Number #27939 
Inmate Housing U2-214 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. box250 
Draper, Utah 84020-0250 
· -Re: Transfer 
Dear Jack, 
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;\TT<)R~RYS AT LAW 
May 28, 2009 
290 West Center Street 
PO Box•L" 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
Tel: 801-373-4912 
Downstairs Fax: 801-373-4964 
Upstairs Fax: 801-371-6964 
www.esplinweight.com 
I certainly remember our conversation about your wanting a transfer. I also remember 
that both Mary and I advised-you that. being• able to be transferred was not a condition of your. 
plea, and that you should make the decision based upon the other considerations such as strength 
of the state's case, likelihood of being able to g~t a better result from a jury, and being able to be 
assured of getting the death penalty off the table. I recall that your decision was based on those 
factors, not the possibility of getting a transfer·. 
However, I do know that getting a transfer was important to you. I did indicate that I 
would be willing to assist you financially in paying the transfer fee. I am still willing to do that 
(although the amount you initially indicated was-~upposed to be around $2,000.00 as opposed the 
$3,800.00 it apparently now will cost). I have been in touch with the transportation division to 
arrange the payment. I wanted to talk with Anne Hobbs, who is the person in charge of transfers 
and who was the person I talked with ini1;i?fly to see if an L WOP prisoner could be eligible for a 
compassionate transfer. I w~ not' ~l!{e to'·talk ~th her and the information I received caused me 
some concern. The reason is that tb.ei~oney needs to be in place before the transfer people even 
send the request to Nevada. Iffor·some reason Nevada declines to accept the transfer, the :funds 
are not returned to the person who posted them. Also, the reason the cost is so high to transfer a 
prisoner from here to Nevada is ~t the cost includes a return trip so that if the prisoner gets to 
Nevada and then decides -~e doesn't like it there, ~ere are funds there to finance the return trip, 
.. ' 
JackBrown 
May 28, 2009 
Page2 
so that's where the difference between the approx. $2,000.00 you originally thought the cost to 
be and the approx. $4,000.00 that they want up front. Since you are on an LWOP sentence if 
you stay in Nevada for the duration of the sentence, the money for the transfer back is never ~ed 
or returned. 
So this is where I have a problem. I am certainly willing to put up the whole amount if in 
fact your transfer goes through. However, I have reservations about paying the funds in and then 
having Nevada refuse to accept your transfer. In that case, I would be out the money and you 
would still be at the USP. 
I was able to contact Anne Hobbs recently .to see if there is a way I can post the money 
and then·if tb:e transfer 'doesn't go through get th~ money refunded. She has indicated ta me that 
she has discussed this situation with the new deputy warden because she has concerns about the 
current system since it results in those who would finance transfers (in most cases family 
members) being reluctant to do so. The deputy warden has been out of town but will be back 
next Monday. She has promised to bring the issue up to see if there is a way to either change the 
procedure or to axrange for me to guarantee payment upon acceptance by Nevad~ Hopefully, 
the issue will be resolved and you can be on your way. I have the funds ready as soon as th.ere is 
a procedure in place. 
Cc: 
Sincerely, 
ESPLIN I WEIGHT, 
Attorneys at La.=__.._,... 
